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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- EASTMAN KODAK CO. v. IMAGE TECHNICAL SERV-
- ICES, INC., et al.
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the ninth circuit
- No. 90-1029. Argued December 10, 1991-Decided June 8, 1992
-
- After respondent independent service organizations (ISOs) began
- servicing copying and micrographic equipment manufactured by
- petitioner Eastman Kodak Co., Kodak adopted policies to limit the
- availability to ISOs of replacement parts for its equipment and to
- make it more difficult for ISOs to compete with it in servicing such
- equipment. Respondents then filed this action, alleging, inter alia,
- that Kodak had unlawfully tied the sale of service for its machines
- to the sale of parts, in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act, and had
- unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the sale of
- service and parts for such machines, in violation of 2 of that Act.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Kodak, but the
- Court of Appeals reversed. Among other things, the appellate court
- found that respondents had presented sufficient evidence to raise a
- genuine issue concerning Kodak's market power in the service and
- parts markets, and rejected Kodak's contention that lack of market
- power in service and parts must be assumed when such power is
- absent in the equipment market.
- Held:
- 1.Kodak has not met the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
- 56(c) for an award of summary judgment on the 1 claim. Pp.7-27.
- (a)A tying arrangement-i. e., an agreement by a party to sell
- one product on the condition that the buyer also purchases a differ-
- ent (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
- product from any other supplier-violates 1 only if the seller has
- appreciable economic power in the tying product market. Pp.7-8.
- (b)Respondents have presented sufficient evidence of a tying
- arrangement to defeat a summary judgment motion. A reasonable
- trier of fact could find, first, that service and parts are two distinct
- products in light of evidence indicating that each has been, and
- continues in some circumstances to be, sold separately, and, second,
- that Kodak has tied the sale of the two products in light of evidence
- indicating that it would sell parts to third parties only if they agreed
- not to buy service from ISOs. Pp.8-9.
- (c)For purposes of determining appreciable economic power in
- the tying market, this Court's precedents have defined market power
- as the power to force a purchaser to do something that he would not
- do in a competitive market, and have ordinarily inferred the exist-
- ence of such power from the seller's possession of a predominate
- share of the market. Pp.9-10.
- (d)Respondents would be entitled under such precedents to a
- trial on their claim that Kodak has sufficient power in the parts
- market to force unwanted purchases of the tied service market, based
- on evidence indicating that Kodak has control over the availability of
- parts and that such control has excluded service competition, boosted
- service prices, and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service.
- Pp.10-11.
- (e)Kodak has not satisfied its substantial burden of showing
- that, despite such evidence, an inference of market power is unrea-
- sonable. Kodak's theory that its lack of market power in the primary
- equipment market precludes-as a matter of law-the possibility of
- market power in the derivative aftermarkets rests on the factual
- assumption that if it raised its parts or service prices above competi-
- tive levels, potential customers would simply stop buying its equip-
- ment. Kodak's theory does not accurately describe actual market
- behavior, since there is no evidence or assertion that its equipment
- sales dropped after it raised its service prices. Respondents offer a
- forceful reason for this discrepancy: the existence of significant
- information and switching costs that could create a less responsive
- connection between aftermarket prices and equipment sales. It is
- plausible to infer from respondents' evidence that Kodak chose to
- gain immediate profits by exerting market power where locked-in
- customers, high information costs, and discriminatory pricing limited
- and perhaps eliminated any long-term loss. Pp.11-24.
- (f)Nor is this Court persuaded by Kodak's contention that it is
- entitled to a legal presumption on the lack of market power because
- there is a significant risk of deterring procompetitive conduct.
- Because Kodak's service and parts policy is not one that appears
- always or almost always to enhance competition, the balance tips
- against summary judgment. Pp.24-26.
- 2.Respondents have presented genuine issues for trial as to
- whether Kodak has monopolized or attempted to monopolize the
- service and parts markets in violation of 2. Pp.27-33.
- (a)Respondents' evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the
- parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily
- available substitutes, is sufficient to survive summary judgment on
- the first element of the monopoly offense, the possession of monopoly
- power. Kodak's contention that, as a matter of law, a single brand
- of a product or service can never be a relevant market contravenes
- cases of this Court indicating that one brand of a product can consti-
- tute a separate market in some instances. The proper market
- definition in this case can be determined only after a factual inquiry
- into the commercial realities faced by Kodak equipment owners.
- Pp.28-29.
- (b)As to the second element of a 2 claim, the willful use of
- monopoly power, respondents have presented evidence that Kodak
- took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its
- control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the service
- market. Thus, liability turns on whether valid business reasons can
- explain Kodak's actions. However, none of its asserted business
- justifications-a commitment to quality service, a need to control
- inventory costs, and a desire to prevent ISOs from free-riding on its
- capital investment-are sufficient to prove that it is entitled to a
- judgment as a matter of law. Pp.29-32.
- 903 F.2d 612, affirmed.
-
- Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
- quist, C. J., and White, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.
- Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Thomas,
- JJ., joined.
-